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Much like phenomenology, the philosophical movement of economic person-
alism has preceded its complete and clear awareness of itself as a philosophical
position. This article attempts to articulate what exactly this position is by em-
ploying a phenomenological analysis. The organization of this investigation
consists of three parts. The first is a linguistic analysis of the names economics and
personalism that attempts to arrive at a joint meaning of these terms. The second
is a regressive inquiry from meaning to a priori apprehension, and this examina-
tion is aimed at making the essential nature of economic personalism perspicu-
ous. The third presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for either conduct
or a situation to qualify as an object in the domain of economic personalism.
Introduction
The task set forth in the title of this paper involves, among other things, the
analysis of a linguistic symbol, a name, an unfamiliar name whose meaning
has not been clearly articulated to date. The name economic personalism was
developed in 1996 by Gregory Gronbacher to refer to the union of two areas of
investigation: free-market economics and an obscure philosophical movement
called personalism.2 Much like phenomenology, the existence of economic per-
sonalism as a philosophical movement has preceded its complete and clear
awareness of itself, its principles, and its methodology. Five years after coming
into being as an idea, the work of clearly defining the meaning of economic
personalism and demarcating its scope is just beginning. The present investi-
gation is thus the first attempt to articulate those truths that pertain to eco-
nomic personalism.
Unlike socialism or market socialism, economic personalism is no utopia.
Kevin Schmiesing shows instances of economic personalism in the world that
occurred even before its formal inception.3 Economic personalism is thus not
only the name of an idea that occupies interdisciplinary investigations, it is an
idea abstracted from particular real-world instances that share the same mean-
ing in common. The examination of its meaning and of what particulars fall in
this kind shall require three steps. First, a linguistic analysis of the name eco-
nomic personalism will be given by means of an investigation of its sources.
153Markets & Morality152 What Is Economic Personalism?
Montague tells the story of a family and its relation to the Capulet family in the
context of the story, Romeo and Juliet.
If we attempt to distill from Shakespeare a common-sense view of names,
we could say that names neither enjoy independent nor real existence in the
same way as a person or a concrete thing does, but names do acquire a meaning
that is carried by the essential nature of the named persons and things. In this
way, names tell a story about the things being named. But we must ask whether
the story a name tells is a true story. If we consider concrete, tangible things,
the answer is easy. The meaning of the name rose is verified and confirmed
with every encounter one has with an instance of the category rose: its distinc-
tive scent, its beauty, its velvety petals, its thorns. We know a rose from anything
that is not a rose. An artificial rose, then, is a misnomer since it is not a special
kind of rose but no rose at all, despite any possible resemblance.
If we consider abstract, intangible things, the answer is not so easy. Is there
a true story that can be objectively told by the name of an idea? The idea of
conformity with fact, for example, is known by the name of truth. To say that
something is true is to say that it is a fact, or that it conforms with an actual
state of affairs. This is the story that the name truth tells. Nonetheless, truth is
widely disputed today. There is no truth, some may argue, so the name of this
idea tells us nothing. We may reply, however, that we encounter truth in our
ordinary experience of things in the world. Every time that there is a corre-
spondence between belief and fact, truth is found. If I believe, for example, that
there are roses in a vase on my desk, there are facts in the world that will settle
the truth or falsity of my belief. The only problem may be that we may not have
knowledge of such facts to be certain of the truth. It is perhaps this lack of
complete certainty that kindles people’s suspicions about truth. But suppose
that I am blindfolded when I sit at my desk, so I cannot see that the roses are
there. Further suppose that I have a cold, so I cannot smell their sweet scent. It
is, nonetheless, true that the roses are in a vase on my desk even though I do not
have knowledge of this fact. Truth is not dependent upon knowledge. The
absence of certain knowledge of some facts does not and should not prevent us
from advancing theories that attempt to formulate a truth of something in the
world. If we formulate it correctly, whether we ever gain certain knowledge of
this accomplishment, we shall have discovered the objective story, the truth,
the facts, of this something in the world.
However, all ideas do not correspond neatly to a whole (a rose) or a unified
collection (a bunch of roses) that has concrete, physical existence. Consider
the ideas of liberty, beauty, and promise. To what whole or unified collection in
the world do these ideas neatly correspond? This is difficult to say. Nonetheless,
Second, an examination of the essential nature of economic personalism. Third,
and finally, a description of the things that themselves realize economic per-
sonalism.
The Tales That Names Tell: Truth or Inconsequence?
Let us begin by laying the ground for a linguistic analysis. It is impossible to
conceive of any complex ideas without the aid of verbal expression. Consider a
moral value judgment such as “This king is just” (or, good, kind, courageous,
heroic, and so on). How do we bring to mind the idea of justice without recall-
ing the word justice? It is difficult to conceive of abstract thought without em-
ploying words as symbols that have meanings that more or less persist through
infinite applications and are impervious to the status of the particulars to which
the meanings apply. Meaning is thus tied with language and, thereby, the proper
use of language not only makes the precise referent clear and distinguishable
from any other possible referent, but it captures the aboutness of the idea
applicable to the relevant referent. Language also facilitates the development
and understanding of abstract ideas, and it serves to document them in theo-
retical research with names.4 Names denote things, either as kinds (king, queen)
or as particulars (King George, Queen Sofia).
The examination of the nature of names is relevant at this juncture, since
economic personalism is a name. Shakespeare sheds light on this examination.
He was not fooled by names. In Scene II of Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare
clearly points out that names do not alter the essential nature of the things they
name. “What’s in a name?” asks Juliet. “That which we call a rose,” she ob-
serves, “by any other name would smell as sweet.” But there is an even stronger
point that is suggested in a lesser-known line of Juliet’s famous soliloquy. “What’s
a Montague?” asks Juliet. She answers, “It is nor hand, nor foot, nor arm, nor
face, nor any other part belonging to a man.” Juliet’s existential reflections dis-
tinguish names from individual substances, but also from independent sub-
stances.5 In other words, even a proper name such as Montague does not itself
have any intrinsic existence independently of a particular and independent sub-
stance such as is this man Romeo Montague. Yet, Shakespeare also recognizes
that the name Romeo Montague does not merely stand for a person. Instead,
proper names do carry sense or meaning. Otherwise, the name Montague would
not mean “enemy” to a Capulet. Names acquire sense or meaning in virtue of
the particulars to which they are associated and within a context and situation.
In this sense, all names, even proper names, tell a story.6 The name rose tells
about the sweet scent of the particular roses one may encounter. The name
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a real-world correspondence to the idea. The idea of economic personalism
should not be immune to this type of analysis. Let us proceed, then, with an
examination of its composite name-parts economics and personalism to investi-
gate separately the story that is told by each.
A Little Story of Economics
During the classical period of economic thought, which lasted from the
late eighteenth-century to the late nineteenth-century, economics was described
as a science that targets the study of wealth and of actions motivated only by the
incentive of profits. It is now clear that profit-seeking behavior is only one
manifestation of the necessity of choice in man’s natural economizing behav-
ior. We may characterize this behavior as natural since it arises from man’s
recognition of the state of scarcity in nature in the sense of having more wants
than means to satisfy them.10 The formulation of the theory of subjective value
helped to bring about this change in the views of economists concerning the
scope of their discipline. According to this theory, economic value is the sig-
nificance that a subject attaches to a thing whenever he perceives a causal
connection between this thing and the satisfaction of a present, urgent want.11
Economic value is subjective because its existence depends on it being felt by a
subject. But the subject may be wrong in his value judgment such that he
attributes value to a thing that, in fact, will not or cannot satisfy his present,
urgent want. The truth of economic value judgments is settled, then, by those
facts about the thing that make it the case that it can satisfy the relevant want as
expected by the agent.
Since the advent of the theory of subjective economic value, economics
has been viewed as a general theory of choice whose primary focus is the
investigation of economic value in relation to an individual’s total utility.12 The
province of economics is thus broader than what is still typically believed. In
the late twentieth-century in particular, economists have applied economic
analysis to advance a multitude of theories that examine choices concerning
ends not usually associated with economic investigations. For example, Gary
Becker and George Stigler have advanced theories of love and marriage founded
in economic analysis.13 Other theories include the economic analysis of crime,
political decision-making, law, and sex.14 This broad application of economic
analysis to all aspects of human choice has provided interesting insights that
no other discipline could have provided.
Nonetheless, this direction has led many economists to hold the extreme
view that economics is a science that provides the tools for examining every
kind of human action.15 Accordingly, then, we could suppose that moral action
these ideas are abstractions from properties of real particulars. Suppose that we
are presented with a situation of a promise between two people and besides
perceiving the physical objects that constitute it, we also apprehend the nature
of the situation itself. Perhaps it is a business contract between two industrial-
ists. But we may have also observed a similar situation between a man and a
woman about to be betrothed that, although in a context distinct from the first,
shares the same nature. We thus form the idea of a promise by abstracting from
particulars. The determinate properties of any abstract idea are, then, timeless,
unchanging, and impervious to the coming into being or ceasing to exist of the
particulars to which they apply. Once the idea thus exists in the mind, it be-
comes realized in the world with every instance. The idea of liberty may be
realized, for example, in unfettered societies of honest and responsible indi-
viduals, or in the flight of an eagle, and in the abolition of slavery. The idea of
beauty may be realized in a sunset, the color of a rose, or the language of
Shakespeare. The idea of a promise is realized in an honest handshake follow-
ing an agreement, in someone’s fulfillment of an obligation, or in someone’s
claim against a broken agreement.
The names of ideas thus hold meaning. But the meaning associated with
the names of ideas presents two problems. The first is presented when the
meaning of an idea is not known at all or not well-understood. This is the case
with those who object to the idea of “truth”; the solution to this problem is
straightforward, though not necessarily easy. The second problem is more
troublesome insofar as the meanings of some names only refer to immanent
things and, thus, do not express truly something that is the case in the world
because either they are sine fundamento in re or the real existence of an in-
stance is impossible. Names such as Sherlock Holmes, Pegasus, Meinong’s square-
circle, and market socialism, exemplify this case.7 This second problem is not
presented by fictional names, since we are capable of directing our minds to
fictional objects and situations with such surrender as to experience feelings in
response. Yet this surrender does not lead us to confuse fiction with what is
real. We do not confuse response feelings to the fictional situation with bona
fide feelings we would experience in real situations.8 Rather, the problem pre-
sents itself whenever names are arbitrarily created to distinguish objects in the
framework of a theory. A reasonable person who would never have assumed
Sherlock Holmes to be a real person, may have believed that there could be
real-world instances of market socialism as it was theoretically and most opti-
mistically portrayed.9 It is precisely because of this problem that it is safest to
maintain suspect any new name for an abstract idea until it has been rigor-
ously examined and, if possible, subjected to a test of truth that attempts to find
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specification in the description of ends in order for the means to be deliberated
and evaluated according to their suitability in satisfying a particular end. As a
result, those actions whose ends are general or abstract in nature, or obscure in
their descriptions, present cases of human action inaccessible to economic
analysis.
Consider the case of an entrepreneur whose firm is suffering from cash
flow problems. He recognizes that increasing his cash flow is not only a spe-
cific end, but also the most urgent one to save his firm from bankruptcy. He
evaluates three alternatives to achieve this end: obtaining a loan, lowering
production, and laying off employees. Among these, the latter is the most
efficient solution since it will not impose the burden of a debt as the first
alternative would and, if he selects management employees, then his produc-
tion would not be directly affected. But his management employees have been
part of the firm since the beginning and they are friends. Furthermore, one of
them is two months away from becoming fully vested in his retirement ben-
efits. Even if economic analysis confirms that laying off the management team
is the most efficient means to achieve the end of solving the cash flow prob-
lem, this solution conflicts with a broader purpose he has of leading a virtuous
life. Harming persons, especially friends, is irreconcilable with this broader
purpose, even if the harm is unintentional. If a case such as this is examined
with the tools of mainstream economic analysis, we could expect two kinds of
replies. One reply may be the attempt to reduce the entrepreneur’s broad end
of virtue to a specific end such as to save friends. The decision would be thus
between laying off his management team (and thereby save his firm) and the
speculated specific end of saving his friends. This reply is neither satisfactory
nor rigorous in its contribution to ideas that may fall at the boundaries of other
disciplines. The other reply may be that moral dilemmas are not analyzable by
means of economics. This would be the correct reply. Nonetheless, this does
not help us in finding a solution for the multitude of ordinary situations in
which our specific goals and our broad goals come tied together in one prob-
lem. Enter personalism.
Personalism: What Does The Person Have To Do With It?
The name personalism is a derivative of the name person. A person is not
merely an individual substance but, a fortiori, an independent substance.16
This is to say that a person’s existence is independent relative to the existence of
another being in the world.17 But the definition of a person is controversial
because of the philosophical difficulties involved in stating exactly what a
human person is. One of these difficulties is associated with the disagreements
could be subjected to economic analysis. Moral propositions, too, could be
assumed to be derivable from propositions concerning economic facts. But if
we consider the moral proposition that one ought to be charitable within the
tools of economic analysis, this proposition would be inadmissible within
economic criteria. It is clear, then, that the extreme view of the applicability of
economic analysis must be put into question. This extreme view ignores the
categorial distinction between propositions of fact that economics may legiti-
mately advance and those moral propositions that fall outside the disciplinary
boundaries of economics.
We can accept the view that economics is the science of those kinds of
human actions that target specific, definite ends. These, perhaps, constitute the
majority of human actions. Nonetheless, since economics is not a normative
science that aims to prescribe how an agent ought to act, economics is not
equipped to deal with broad ends that require specification. If the ends are, for
example, to be virtuous or to be rich, then economics will have little to say
about what are the best means to attain such ends, for the description of such
ends require clarification, definition, or specification. Similar to those human
actions that have specific, definite ends, human actions with broad ends are
also purposeful. It must be clear that all purposeful behavior is economizing
behavior insofar as determining a purpose involves a choice among alterna-
tives. But all purposeful action does not necessarily target specific, definite
ends. This suggests that economics is not equipped to analyze all economizing
behavior, but only those with specific, definite ends. Consequently, economics
cannot legitimately address every kind of human action, at least not those
actions that fall under the heading of broad ends.
However, if the end is to have a coat for the winter, then the agent is con-
fronted with specific, alternative ways to allocate his resources toward this end
by sacrificing other, less urgent needs. In this case, an economist may examine
the agent’s alternatives and say that this or that action is the most appropriate
to achieve the agent’s desired end. If an economist’s role were to elucidate what
an economic choice should be, then economics would not be wholly distinct
from ethics or sociology, and it could thus attempt to tackle advancing pre-
scriptions for broad ends such as being virtuous or being rich. But no general
theory of choice as is economics could be obtained from broad ends since, at
best, an economist could only speculate what purposeful actions the agent
intends to take in order to achieve such ends.
The story that economics tells, then, is a story of choice in light of the
condition of scarcity in which every individual, whether rich or poor, finds
himself. The economic analysis of means to meet ends requires precision and
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bears no resemblance to the young boy you remember. Despite these changes,
you are able to recognize your friend’s smile, his sense of humor, and, most
perspicuously, the shared memories of an earlier time. What characteristics,
then, show the personal identity of any human person? We could say that there
are physical characteristics, such as facial features, skin coloring, and finger-
prints that do not change substantially over time. Hence, these are necessary
but not sufficient conditions for describing the personal identity attached to
each individual person. These are not sufficient conditions since, suppose one
person loses his memory or, worse, his mind, then it would be difficult to say
that his personal identity has continued despite any continuity in certain physi-
cal characteristics.
No one is a dualist any more. The mind and body, we have discovered, are
not two separate Cartesian substances. Clearly, there is a body that can be
uniquely identified for each person. It is nonetheless difficult to say what is the
thing that distinguishes a living body from a cadaver. Some, such as Locke,
argue that this ineffable thing is memory.20 This argument has some problems:
persons forget, children only have short-term memories, older adults may lose
their short-term memories, and, ultimately, it presupposes personal identity so
it does not help in laying the foundation for specifying what is personal iden-
tity. Hume argued that our belief in such a thing as personal identity is not
justified, since any individual is just a collection of perceptions.21 The fact that
these perceptions invariably change serves to show that there is no identity to
be found or grounded in changing things. That we fail to see this problem,
Hume says, is only the result of our tendency to link the superficial similarity
of our perceptions because some changes occur in regular and recurring pat-
terns.
Hume’s argument, perhaps unintentionally, pointed to the ancient
epistemic problem of vagueness. 22 Suppose that a person loses his hair and
becomes bald. Intuitively, we will still believe he is a person and the same
person as before. Now suppose that Beethoven had not only lost his hearing,
but also his sight and both hands before losing his mind. Is he the same person,
the same Beethoven as before? Would he have still written his ninth sym-
phony? What changes are allowed in a person in order to be considered iden-
tical to the person he was before such changes? It is difficult to indicate the
exact extent of allowable changes, hence the vagueness problem in our know-
ing the exact boundary for personal identity. But this epistemic shortcoming
does not present an obstacle to an ontological examination of the person.23
We can affirm thus far that the human person is an individual substance
with the potential for rationality. It is also true that the human person is an
that result from the distinction between the essential features that define a per-
son and those accidental features that arise, go away, or are a result of the pas-
sage of time. An accidental feature may be a property, such as size, since the
same individual being grows from conception to adulthood and may grow a
lot or not so much relative to others of the same kind. But accidental features
may also refer to proper parts of an individual being such as hair or the lack
thereof, since one’s baldness does not affect one’s personhood.
This distinction between essence and accident is very old and one of the
most significant legacies we inherited from Aristotle. The disagreements con-
cerning this distinction are many. According to Boethius, a person is an indi-
vidual substance of a rational nature.18 To say that rationality is the essential
feature of the human person, for example, is to exclude the unborn, children
younger than six years of age, the mentally ill, and older adults who are no
longer able to function rationally. Nonetheless, one can eliminate this prob-
lem by simply saying that the potential for rationality is an essential feature of
the human person. In this way, the unborn and children younger than six years
of age can be seen as having a rational potentiality that shall be actualized at a
later time. The case of the mentally ill can thus be seen as a class of human
beings whose rational potential may never be actualized. Aging adults can be
seen as a class of human beings who have enjoyed the actualization of their
potential rationality, but this state is now reversing to its potential status. De-
spite all this, rationality is perhaps not the single essential feature for man and
we shall examine this in our discussion. However, solving this problem does
not clear all the obstacles from our way, since there are many other issues.
Consider that rationality, the feature that Boethius first stated as a feature proper
to man, Kant appropriated to lay the foundation of the moral principle that
this feature marks man as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to an
end.19 For Kant, then, rationality is not merely one of the essential features of
man, but the only feature from which man obtains a morally relevant value.
A second disagreement results from the problem of personal identity. What
does it mean to say that I have a unique personal identity that is distinct from
all other persons? We could argue that a second essential feature of man, be-
sides the potential rationality, is numerical identity in the sense that one mem-
ber of the class of human persons can be recognized as distinct from other
members of the same class. But there is more to the problem of personal
identity, since we have only identified the individuating aspect of the problem.
In addition, the individuated member of the class must also be recognizable
over time and despite any changes. Consider the case of seeing a friend you
have not seen since childhood. This bald, bearded, round, bespectacled man
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objects and persons. The human person, for example, stands in an immediate
two-sided dependence relation to certain consumption goods obtained from
nature, such as wheat and chickens. This relation is two-sided because the
human person depends on these fruits of nature for survival, and these fruits of
nature depend on man for either their cultivation or farming to exist as they do
today. Without man, there would not be vast wheat fields, nor could we find
millions of chickens protected from other predators. These cases exemplify
symbiotic relations.
There are other goods that may suggest the existence of mediated relations
between persons and nonperson objects, such as cars or airplanes because
these are not what economists call first-order goods, meaning that they are not
at man’s immediate disposal as are tulips and apples. Instead, these goods,
called higher-order economic goods, require other goods as mediate means for
their production.29 Accordingly, a car requires factories, steel, petroleum, and
so forth, all of which are mediate goods. Nonetheless, these higher-order eco-
nomic goods stand in a direct relation to a person, since factories are built and
run by persons, the ore employed to make steel is mined by miners, steel is
produced by steelworkers, and petroleum is drilled for and refined by persons.
The person-to-factory and person-to-steel dependency relations, however, are
different to the person-to-petroleum relation. The person-to-factory relation is
a two-sided dependency relation because man depends on factories for the
existence of industrial production, and the existence of factories as such de-
pends on man, for otherwise they would be merely buildings with artifacts.
The person-to-steel relation is similarly a two-sided dependency relation be-
cause man depends on steel for the existence of cars and other capital equip-
ment, and the existence of steel is dependent upon man, for otherwise there
would be only naturally existing ore in the world. The person-to-petroleum
relation is different, since it presents a one-sided dependency relation. Man
depends on petroleum for various uses, but there is no reverse dependency
relation here as there was in the previous cases.
Two-sided mutual relations can and do exist between persons. This is the
case with marriage and the mutual dependency of husband and wife, such that
a husband would not be a husband without a wife and vice versa. This is also
the case with friendships, a buyer and a seller, a doctor and a patient, and so on.
There are also numerous cases of n-sided relations, such as associations, firms,
governments, and churches. But not all complex wholes are constituted only
by n-sided relations among persons, lest we do not consider cases such as the
space program, universities, and every nonservice enterprise.
If the foregoing characterization of personalism is correct, then it should
independent substance, such that his existence does not depend on another
human person’s concept of him, or on the existence of some other human
person.24 The fact that a human person is dependent on things for his survival,
as well as being spiritually, emotionally, or psychologically dependent on other
persons, does not alter his ontological status as an independent substance. The
personal identity issue, however, is quite problematic.25
As we have discussed earlier, there are two criteria that we can accept of
individuation and personal identity: the physical criterion and the memory
criterion. The difficulty is in stating precisely what constitutes each of these.
But this is not all. There are two additional considerations at the center of
personal identity: moral agency and vocation. Is the latter, for example, a physi-
cal attribute? Were Beethoven or Mozart born musicians? Or did their respec-
tive experiences stored in memory help to shape their individual musical genius?
All we know is that each of them is known and recognized by the music they
composed. In this sense, their creations are evidence of their identity. Mother
Teresa, too, can be identified by the work to which she dedicated her life. In
following her divine vocation, she also created something uniquely hers in the
world. If we now turn to moral agency, similar questions arise. Is moral agency,
for example, hardwired in our brains or an acquired attribute? The question of
what agency is raises other difficulties, but we shall not go into these.26 What is
clear is that neither the physical criterion, nor the memory criterion, adequately
account for the moral agency or the co-creatorship of the person’s being.
Personalism thus arises within this background of philosophical problems
concerning the ontological status of the human person and all related epistemic
problems with which we are confronted. As a twentieth-century philosophi-
cal position, personalism is relatively new.27 What exactly is such a position,
however, remains unclear. The standard description of personalism is that the
person is at the center of its analysis. But this description is vague since it does
not explain the context in which the centrality of the person is fundamental.
The centrality of the person in the context of an ontological investigation
could mean that the only denizens of reality are persons. From an epistemic
perspective, this position could mean that we can know only persons. But
there are myriads of other contextual possibilities.28
Rather than adopting one of the interpretations of personalism already set
forth in the literature, I shall propose a new one. I believe that personalism is
best described as an ontological structure in which reality is fundamentally
personal. This means that all existents stand in an immediate one-sided de-
pendence relation or in n-sided dependence relations to the person. Since the
person is fundamental, there are no mediate relations between nonperson
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them, see them, or think of them. This simple deduction allows for the intro-
duction of other possibilities, such as that there are microbeings, for example
quarks, or macrobeings, for example galaxies, or relations of any such beings in
the world to which we have no access and, thus, no knowledge of their exist-
ence. Without this realist direction, no scientific discoveries would have been
attempted for anything that is beyond our sensorial reach. The idealist strand
of personalism is thus ontologically weak.
It is important to point out that, for some, idealist personalism also went
hand in hand with atheism.31 The case of God raises two additional problems
for idealist personalism. First, since it presumably holds atheism on the basis
of having no direct or evident knowledge of God, this does not necessary lead
to the conclusion that God does not exist. The only conclusion that can be
drawn is that God’s existence is not known or verifiable. Second, one of the
principles of atheist personalism is the denial of the existence of God. This
judgment necessarily conjures up the idea of God in order to produce a rejec-
tion of the idea. It would follow, then, that God exists in virtue of being the
subject of thought, even if God was the subject of a negative judgment. Conse-
quently, a personalism that is both idealist and atheist is logically inconsistent.
The second ontological framework is what has been called realist person-
alism and it presents a contrast with idealist personalism. It can be described as
a structure constituted by two types of beings: persons and objects. This frame-
work of reality is called personalist because it grants persons a higher value
than that of any other object in the world. It is a realist ontology because,
despite this hierarchical value ordering, it does not make the existence of any
object dependent on a person’s direct knowledge of it. The realist personalists
in the Christian anthropological tradition include the French Étienne Gilson
and Jacques Maritain. If the German Max Scheler is to be characterized as a
personalist, as he has been by some commentators, he would rightfully belong
to the realist camp. Perhaps he is called a personalist because of his hierarchi-
cal structure of person-values as realizations of the good or evil. For Scheler, the
value moral goodness is always a quality of the will itself, never an object of the
will. Since acts of will are always acts of a person, the existence of a person is a
necessary presupposition of all volitional acts, good or evil. Polish personalism
also follows a realist direction, and its best exponent is Karol Wojtyla.
We must now ask, Is realist personalism adequately characterized by an on-
tological structure of existents standing from one-sided to n-sided relations?
Once again, the answer is yes. There are some differences with idealist person-
alism in the framework of relations, since the dependencies are not founded
on the knowledge or perceptions of persons. Realist personalism in the Christian
also suitably describe any of the various strands of personalism. Let us explore
this further. The chief difference among the various strands of personalism lie
in what is meant by personal or the person. These can be divided into two
kinds of personalist ontologies. First, there is the ontology of idealist personal-
ism that depicts reality as consisting only of a society of persons. Accordingly,
nothing exists independently from persons. In this sense, then, idealist per-
sonalism assumes that the human person is central to reality and, as such,
reality is the human society and, thus, human knowledge shapes reality.30 This
assumption is founded on an idealist epistemology that denies our knowledge
of things in the world that exist independently of our perception and the
language employed to describe such things. Instead, it relies on the following
premise: All that exists is that which is thought of or perceived. If something is
not capable of being thought of or perceived, then, it does not exist. Idealist
personalism thus equates the human person with the human mind, human
perception, or human knowledge.
Is idealist personalism adequately characterized by an ontological struc-
ture of existents standing from one-sided to n-sided relations? The answer is
yes, although most, if not all, relations in this ontological framework seem to
be only of the one-sided type. If any nonperson object in the world exists and,
furthermore, its existence is dependent on a person’s knowledge or percep-
tion, then not only this but every nonperson object has a one-sided depen-
dence relation with a person. There could be cases, however, in which n-sided
dependence relations arise whenever there is a complex whole such as a gov-
ernment or a legal system. For a court proceeding, for example, the existence of
a particular crime must be accepted by the judge under the principle that the
police have knowledge of this crime or, at least, a justified belief of its exist-
ence. Suppose that the crime was an unwitnessed murder, then the existence
of the crime is dependent on the beliefs of the authority investigating and
submitting it for a criminal trial. The judge at this trial has no direct knowledge
of this crime, so the basis of the trial is dependent on the representation of the
police authority.
The problem with this ontological framework is that it fails to account for
the possibility that something may exist, but whose existence is either not
known to us and thus remains unthought of, or whose existence lies beyond
the limits of our unaided human perception, so it remains unperceived. From
an ordinary common-sense perspective alone, it would not be difficult to be-
gin from the assumption that there are individuals who exist in places too
distant for us ever to have the chance to know them or perceive them in any
way. Yet, we would not doubt that they exist simply because we do not know
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the one hand, personalism carries with it the significance of the world viewed
from every aspect of human activity and thought. It applies to every realm of
human experience such that reality can be investigated accordingly, for ex-
ample, a moral reality, an aesthetic reality, a religious reality, a supernatural
reality. In this sense, personalism has a broader scope than economics. On the
other hand, personalism does not have the conceptual machinery to do the
kind of analysis that economics can do. It is for this reason that economic
reality is a difficult subject for personalism but not an impossible one.
To arrive at the integrated whole of economic personalism we must start
with an economic situation, meaning a situation of scarcity that leads to a
choice and a cost imposed by the choice (and not merely a situation involving
financial assets). Let us start by assuming a mainstream economic analysis.
Accordingly, we shall rely entirely on an efficiency criterion that points to the
least costly way to achieve a person’s particular economic goal. Efficiency,
broadly understood, is an action for which the benefit is greater than the cost.
Cost minimization and utility maximization are the neoclassical principles of
economically efficient, optimal outcomes.
These goals, however, do not lack a normative, utilitarian aspect. The effi-
ciency principles are derivatives of what is called Pareto optimality, which is the
standard for evaluating the desirability of an allocation of resources. An alloca-
tion is Pareto optimal if there is not other feasible allocation that would make
one person better off without making anyone else worse off. The influence of
Bentham’s utilitarian principle is clear. His moral maxim, as we shall recall,
states that “the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of
morals and legislation.” The strongest criticism that can be raised against Pareto
optimization is that it is impossible for a third party to know what makes a
person better or worse off. Even if this condition is known, it would be impos-
sible to measure and compare.
Modern-day economics has evaded the measurement problems that plague
Pareto-style utilitarianism by replacing the principle of utility maximization
with the analogous principle of wealth maximization. But replacing utility with
wealth does not change the utilitarian criterion for the analysis; it only makes it
easier to measure. This criterion has become not only the prevailing basis of
analysis in the making of economic decisions, but also the method for solving
difficult moral dilemmas.33 The only problem is that even if the consequences
of an action bring about the greatest wealth for the greatest number, the action
itself could be morally wrong. What is worse, utilitarianism is the breeding
ground for relativism. Consider, for example, a world in which the greatest num-
ber consists of Nazis, Fascists, Maoists, or Islamic Jihad terrorists. Further sup-
anthropological tradition, for example, presents a structure of n-sided depen-
dencies for a value hierarchy of existents. Positive-value persons are at the top,
followed by all other nonperson objects, starting from sentient living beings,
nonsentient living beings, then things and, finally, negative-value persons. The
human person is only one of four classes of persons. The other three classes are
the Divine person, angelic persons, and demonic persons. God and angels, in
addition to the human persons, are all positive-value persons; whereas the last
class of persons only has negative values or disvalues. Since Christian personal-
ism is realist, human knowledge of the members of any of these other three
classes of persons is not a requirement for their existence. When we consider
the entire complex whole of persons and objects, what we have is an ontologi-
cal structure in which reality is fundamentally, but not exclusively, personal.
The existence of this person-object complex whole is dependent upon the prop-
erty relations between their members. Hence, there are some relations that are
one-sided dependency relations, some that are two-sided dependency relations,
and some that are n-sided dependency relations.
The story that personalism tells is thus a story of the dependencies and
interdependencies between persons and of persons with every other thing in
the world. The recognition that there are flowers, mountains, and planets in
the world, which may or may not be outside of the human person’s knowl-
edge, is tied with the significance that these things have in a fundamentally
personal world. In the latter, there are complex wholes such as disciplines of
study such as botany, geology, and astronomy, works of art such as van Gogh’s
Irises or Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata, cuisines developed around the fruits
of nature of a mountain range, literature about everything existing or imagin-
able, and so on. These things would not be part of a world that is not funda-
mentally personal. By contrast to the concerns of economics, propositions of
faith, of morality, of aesthetics, and any other that is not purely of fact, do
belong to personalist concerns. For example, the proposition that one ought to
honor one’s word is not only admissible to personalist investigations, but neces-
sary for the existence of fundamentally personal complex wholes such as a
promise.32
The Essential Nature of Economic Personalism
When we bring together the respective stories told by the words economics
and personalism, this integration does not produce a special kind of economics
or economic methodology. To conceive, for example, of a personalistic eco-
nomics would be unintelligible, for economics is already personal in the sense
that it is a theory of human choice. How, then, do these two stories relate? On
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Regardless of which framework one chooses to employ, it must be clear what
are the shortcomings of its respective analyses. In this way, economic analysis
of any brand would not have to be altered in any way, only tempered by the
filtering out of the biases in their solutions. If the wealth maximization prin-
ciple has been applied, then it needs to be recognized that the bias is in the end-
state focus of the analysis: the consequences of the situation under scrutiny.
This bias can be corrected by directing the analysis instead to the facts of the
situation itself and their significance to personal considerations. In the case of
Austrian analysis, it needs to be recognized that the focus of the scrutiny will be
the economic value of the thing under scrutiny and its correlative economic
valuation by the relevant agent. This means that moral value, or any other sort
of noneconomically relevant value, will not be part of an Austrian analysis.
The essential nature of economic personalism is, then, that the form of the
analysis is supplied by economic theory, but the content of the analysis also
matters significantly. In other words, it would matter if the enterprise is harm-
ful to any person’s dignity and well-being. This would be the first thing to settle
and, once cleared, then the economic analysis may begin.37 The specific pre-
scription obtained from the economic analysis must, too, be cleared against
personalist criteria. It may be the case that, in light of the personalist criteria
applied to the initial economic scenario, the agent will need to revise his spe-
cific goals. In this case, a new economic analysis must be applied to the revised
scenario. However, the agent’s recognition of alternative, specific goal, might
not have been possible apart from the economic analysis.
The essence of economic personalism is thus akin to a filter of person-
mindedness that is applied from above as a meta-analysis, to an economic in-
vestigation or situation. Person-mindedness can be described as a network of
relations of persons and things, for example, moral things, aesthetic things,
musical things, and every other aspect of human social reality. We know per-
son-mindedness intuitively as an attitude that can be present in our minds or
forgotten. It is present when our minds are present in the situation before us
and we are able to appreciate the personal character of the world. It is forgotten
when our minds are otherwise occupied and thus not grounded in the here and
now of the personal character of the world. An act of forgiving exemplifies one
of the most pure forms of person-mindedness. It is not self-interested, for some-
times it is difficult and even painful to forgive. An act of forgiveness draws em-
pathy from the very core of personhood and the interconnectedness of persons
that underlies it. Any act that exhibits person-mindedness is connected to the
human social world in a meaningful way. But if the person disconnects from
this world and retreats into his own mind, due to worries or reflections about
pose that their goal is to kill anyone who is not a Nazi, Fascist, Maoist, or Is-
lamic Jihad fighter. Relative to their goals, their actions are good and they bring
about the greatest happiness to the greatest number. In absolute, objective terms,
however, their actions are not only wrong but evil. Utilitarianism cannot ac-
count for this and it is, for this reason, ill-conceived and not a means for discov-
ering truth.
It must be clear that mainstream efficiency analysis has been quite success-
ful in pointing to efficient resource allocation and, generally, how best to make
means meet ends. Economics today, or at any stage of its development since its
emancipation from moral philosophy, has earned the character of a science.
This is not due to its measurement or prediction capabilities, although these do
provide great insight despite errors and imperfections. Three features make eco-
nomics scientific. The first is the universality of its principles, such that any
economic principle is applicable to every particular economy. The second is the
coherence of these principles as a system. The third is the search for the truths
that apply to its domain—their discovery, clarification, and continuous refine-
ment in their articulation. The first two features are evident in neoclassical eco-
nomics. But if science is also to be identified with the seeking of truth, then
some strands of positivist or empirical neoclassical economics may not qualify
as scientific.34 To the extent that economics is a science of human choice, its
principles must be grounded in human social reality and not merely in math-
ematical formulas that work in the sense of producing generally correct predic-
tions. A fortiori, the assumptions of economics must account for the average
person’s common-sense view of the world.
However, neoclassical economics is not the only alternative. The Austrian
school of economics presents a formidable nonmathematical rival.35 Owing
to its nonmathematical character, its theoretical corpus is composed of gen-
eral laws that have a priori foundations.36 More important, it is precisely be-
cause of its nonmathematical character that Austrian economics has not been
forced to adopt a utilitarian principle that lends itself to mathematization. The
advantage is that Austrian economics does not assume the principles of Pareto
optimality or wealth maximization to address neither morally nonrelevant
nor morally relevant economic problems. This, however, does not help the
broader personalist enterprise, since Austrian economics is not equipped at all
to address morally relevant economic problems. In this sense, neither neoclas-
sical economics—because of its ill-conceived utilitarian assumptions—nor
Austrian economics—because it has no morally relevant assumptions—can
tackle morally relevant economic problems alone.
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his entire operations staff as part of the solution, and he rewarded each one for
their contribution toward this goal. The bottom line was important, since his
job was on the line every moment that the airline remained at the border of
bankruptcy. But he recognized that the bottom line would not improve if he
lost sight of the persons who were employees, the persons who were custom-
ers, and the persons who were his potential lenders. His decisions and his
actions exhibited person-mindedness not as a satellite concern, but as part of
his firm’s recovery plan. The actions of Gordon Bethune, the chief executive
officer, and the effects these had on Continental Airlines, exemplify the exist-
ence and success of economic personalism.39
How do we recognize other cases? The idea of economic personalism is an
abstraction from our observations of conduct or real states of affairs that share
the same essence. Consider the idea of forgiveness. This idea is wholly distinct
from our idea of a flower. When we think of a flower, we may call to mind
specific memories of concrete things we call flowers. But when we think of
forgiveness, there is no readily concrete thing in the world to call to mind as
such. Instead, forgiveness is an abstraction from particular instances that have
the essence of forgiveness. There are formal properties of forgiveness that make
it recognizable despite any differences in the situation in which it is presented.
The thing at issue here, then, is the formal properties that make economic
personalism recognizable and, thereby, describable. In other words, the task is
to formulate the sufficient and necessary conditions for some fact, state or
affairs, or conduct to embody economic personalism.
I shall propose the following conditions, although they must be put to the
test continuously, with an eye for new cases that might require further revi-
sions or additions to this list:
1. In the case of conduct, the acting person may be a decision maker or the
agent that freely and consciously carries out a deed in an economic situation or
state of affairs. Conduct that is economic personalist will characterize person-
mindedness absolutely, that is, the conduct is not relative to achieving some
particular, self-interested end.
2. The meaning of conduct is to be understood broadly such that it includes
not only active doing to bring about an economically relevant effect, but also
the acts of thinking and judging, since choosing is an important part of con-
duct that is economically relevant. If, for example, someone chooses not to
intervene to protect someone’s dignity or well-being for the sake of economic
gain, such silence and inaction are themselves characterizable as conduct that
is not economic personalist.
3. In the case of a thing or a real state of affairs, some examples are as follows.
ideas, then person-mindedness wanes and disappears. Person-mindedness is
thus ephemeral.
Economic Personalism In Itself: The Formal Object
Let us summarize what we have to this point. We have examined the name
economic personalism as the name of an idea. Toward this goal, we have analyzed
the meanings of its composite parts, and the time and space situatedness to
which these meanings apply. From this, we have also distilled the essence of the
idea of economic personalism. Now, we must discover the thing to which this
idea refers. How do we recognize the thing we can call economic personalism?
This question presupposes that economic personalism exists in the world. Is
this the case?
Consider the case of an airline that borders on bankruptcy. Consumer con-
fidence is so low that the only passengers who will fly on this airline are those
who receive free tickets as compensation for filling out an application for a
major credit card. Everything points to major budget cuts, employee lay offs,
and fare reductions. A new chief executive officer of this failing company is
named, and he does exactly the opposite. He increases the budget for employee
bonuses in order to reward any increase in the efficiency of the operations.
Accordingly, each employee of an operation center receives a substantial bo-
nus every month for their contribution to sustaining a record of on-time de-
partures and arrivals. Instead of firing those employees at closing operation
centers, he attempts to relocate them in needed, but previously ignored, geo-
graphical areas. Furthermore, he does not reduce fares because, as a person, he
understands that to build a following of loyal customers, he needs to provide
them with good service. This means, therefore, on-time arrivals and depar-
tures, comfortable and well-maintained seats, quality in-flight attention, and
better than average airline food and beverages. All of this is costly; hence, fares
could not be lowered to compete with budget flights. This did not present a
problem in the CEO’s mind, since budget-flight passengers are sporadic and
not likely to be drawn in the high volume necessary to save the airline from
bankruptcy. He focused, instead, on the repeat customers that did not travel
only because of bargain fares. It did not take long before this airline company
became one of the top-ranking airlines in the industry.38 There is no question
that the decisions taken by this leader were founded on sound managerial and
economic planning. But what stands out most of all is his ever-present person-
mindedness. He helped displaced employees find a relocation site or alterna-
tive employment. He thought about the needs of the ordinary person sitting on
the coach section of any one of the airplanes owned by the airline. He included
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acterized by a recognition of scarcity that gives rise to a choice that necessarily
involves a cost. The bearer of the object—the conduct or the real state of af-
fairs—is thus contextually situated in an economic setting. The third element of
this object is the quality of person-mindedness. Without this quality, the object
would be no different than an acting economic agent, or an economic object.
Person-mindedness adds the connectedness of the economic agent or the eco-
nomic object to the human social reality, that world experienced as personally
meaningful.
In short, we can say simply that economic personalism is economic agency
or economic objects connected to human meaning and concern.
Notes
1. By phenomenological analysis I mean the activity of bringing the idea of economic
personalism to epistemic clarity and realist orientation. This has not necessarily been the goal or
the result of some phenomenological enterprises. The specific phenomenological procedure I
follow is that described by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations, namely, linguistic distinc-
tions and clarifications following a regressive inquiry into meaning that leads to essences and,
ultimately, to the a priori structure of the thing-in-itself given in experience. This procedure can
be found in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Roman Ingarden. This article will follow that
analytical procedure without employing any of the phenomenological terminology that Husserl
coined in the effort to identify the steps and parts of the procedures of eidetic reduction and
phenomenological reduction. Not even the term phenomenology shall be used in the text. I am
deeply indebted to Barry Smith for my understanding of phenomenology.
2. Although contemporary mainstream economics can be generally characterized as free-
market economics, some neoclassical schools such as the Chicago School stand out among the
rest. Prior to the emergence of the present neoclassical period, the Austrian school of economics
made its appearance with theoretical contributions that not only ended the classical period by
demonstrating its errors, but these were also received as part of the theoretical foundations of
neoclassical economics. Some of these contributions include the theory of subjective economic
value, the notion of opportunity cost, the notion of imputation, and marginal utility theory (this
last one, however, was also simultaneously developed by Léon Walras and W. Stanley Jevons).
Concerning personalism, we shall examine it in great detail in what follows.
3. See Kevin E. Schmiesing, “The Context of Economic Personalism,” Journal of Markets and
Morality 4, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 176–93. See also Wolfgang Grassl, “Markets and Morality: Austrian
Perspectives on the Economic Approach to Human Behaviour,” in Austrian Economics, eds. Barry
Smith and Wolfgang Grassl (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 139–81.
4. Husserl writes, “Only in [verbal expression] can truth, and in particular the truth of theory,
become an abiding possession of science, a documented, ever available treasure for knowledge
and advancing research.” See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge, 2001),
166.
5. Aristotle employs several senses for the term substance. According to one of these, for
example, a head is an individual substance, but it is not necessarily an independent substance.
Some features of independent substances include extension, an external boundary, connected parts,
and numerical identity through time despite changes to any of its parts.
6. The fundamental difference between names and proper names lies in the generality and
particularity, respectively, of the stories they tell. We can assume a general knowledge of the story
the name rose tells, whereas the sense of Montague and Capulet is particular to the context of Romeo
Things can be artifacts such as toys that are safe or that stimulate higher-level
learning, lyrics that inspire rather than disparage persons, great literature, any-
thing of beauty, any symbol of love or honor, or any material expression of a
virtue, goodness, or any other elevating aspect of human reality. Real states of
affairs include any interaction that manifests respect for a person’s dignity, an
honest deal, promisings, forgivings, the demonstration and appreciation of
human greatness in music or any other art, acts of prayer, a church perceived as
such (and not as a museum or tourist attraction), an athletic competition, win-
ning a game, and so on.
4. The conduct, thing, or real state of affairs must occur in a setting that is
fundamentally economic in nature, which means it must involve a state of scar-
city that gives rise to a choice that, in turn, results in a cost. For the conduct,
fact, or state of affairs to obtain the character of being economical personalist,
its economic nature must be recognizably nested in the richness of human so-
cial reality and the person-mindedness that it conjures. Clearly, the richness of
human social reality does not need to be present in toto in the context of every
particular economic situation.
5. The unifying element of those acts, actions, things, or states of affairs that
become the objects of economic personalism is the quality of person-
mindedness. This quality is present in the intuitive consciousness of the agent.
It is also manifest in the relations of the objects that come together in a real
state of affairs. If we consider the case of the workspace for the employees of the
firm, person-mindedness would be exemplified if the space is adequate for the
tasks given to the employee. If the nature of the work is writing, for example,
the employee will require quiet and separate quarters to function most ad-
equately. If the nature of the job requires machinery, it must be well-
maintained and safe to operate. If the job requires detail work, the workspace
must be adequately lit.  These measures do not merely improve production
because they facilitate the employee’s work; they build loyalties.
If a conduct, a fact, or a state of affairs meets the foregoing conditions, then
it can also be represented as follows:
Economic personalism is an object with three properties: a bearer, an eco-
nomic content, and a unifying quality called person-mindedness. The bearers
are either conduct by a person or a collection of persons, or a thing, or a real
state of affairs in the world, for example, an artifact, an event, an exchange, a
transaction. This object’s existence, then, is dependent on human agency if the
formal object is conduct, and it is dependent on a social object if the formal
object is a thing or a real state of affairs. The content of this object is a situation
that has a fundamentally economic character. Any economic situation is char-
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which converted the theory of market prices into a general theory of human choice.” See Human
Action Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1963), 3.
13. Gary Becker, “A Theory of Marriage: Part I,” and “A Theory of Marriage: Part II,” in The
Essence of Becker, eds. Ramon Felereo and Pablo S. Schwartz (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 1995), 273–309 and 310–28; and A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981).  See also George Stigler, The Theory of Price, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1987), 246–47.
14. Concerning the economics of crime, see Isaac Ehrlich, “Crime, Punishment, and the
Market for Offenses,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 1 (1996): 43–67; and “On the
Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation,
and Deterrence,” American Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981): 307–22. See also Gary S. Becker,
“Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76, no. 2 (1968):
169–217. The economic analysis of political decision-making is best known in economic circles
as ublic choice theory, and the path-breaking work in this area of research is Buchanan’s and
Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent. Concerning the economics of law, see Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Justice and The Problems of Jurisprudence. See also I. Ehrlich and R. A. Posner, “An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,” Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1974): 257–80. Concerning
the economics of sex, see Posner’s Sex and Reason.
15. In Human Action Mises writes: “Economics is the science of every kind of human action,” 3.
It is clear that the scope of economics as a theory of choice is quite broad; however, Mises fails to
understand that economics is not equipped to examine purposeful behavior that is not specific and
definite. A similar criticism is presented in Beyond Self-Interest: A Personalist Approach to Human
Action (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001). Nonetheless, Mises should not bear this cross alone,
since the view that economics is the science of every kind of human action is widely held by econo-
mists. Edward Lazear, for example, admits that economics has been imperialistic but successful. See
Edward P. Lazear, Economic Imperialism, Hoover Institution paper, May 1999, http://faculty-
gsb.stanford.edu/lazear/Personal/PDFs/economic%20imperialism.pdf.
16. See note 5.
17. Smith and Brogaard contrast independent substances with smiles, blushes, or headaches,
which require the existence of other entities as their bearers or carriers. See Barry Smith and
Berit Brogaard, “Sixteen Days,” 6, and is available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/faculty/
smith/articles/embrymaster.pdf.
18. That is, Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia.
19. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
20. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, chap. 27.
21. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, I, part IV.
22. A vagueness problem arises in borderline situations, whenever the application of an
expression to a particular object neither unequivocally applies to the object nor fails to apply.
The expression baldness could be applied to a borderline bald person, but arguably it may not
serve as an adequate description. The textbook case of vagueness is the problem of the ship of
Theseus. This ship was made entirely of wood and one day a wooden plank is replaced by an
aluminum one. On another day, the same thing happens and another wooden plank is replaced
by an aluminum one. This continues until the ship is made entirely of aluminum. Is this ship still
the ship of Theseus? If not, at which point did it cease to be? Similar to the baldness problem,
perhaps one may never know exactly what is this point. This is an epistemic problem because it
concerns knowledge or the lack thereof.
23. The term ontology refers to the philosophical examination of existence (or being) and
reality. Some philosophers distinguish between things that exist and things that are real, that is,
those that have concrete existence. My thoughts exist, for example, but they are not real since
they cannot be felt or touched. In an ontological investigation, there is no room for questioning
about the subject under investigation whether we can know it certainly or justifiably, or whether
we can perceive it or ever have sensorial access to it. These questions do not matter to ontology.
24. One could argue that my coming into being was dependent upon my parents, but this
and Juliet. When we consider nonfictional proper names, the case is similar. If we consider the name
Winston Churchill alongside the name of any person on a bus in downtown Chicago, each name will
tell a story about the named individual. The only difference is that Churchill’s story is undoubtedly
more generally known.
7. Alexius Meinong maintains that there is an entity corresponding to every possible judg-
ment. Unlike his teacher Franz Brentano, Meinong rejected the view that all entities are imma-
nent. The result is a broad ontology of existents that includes existent, subsistent, and nonexistent
objects. Meinong’s idea of the square-circle serves to illustrate the point that the objects of
thought do not exclude impossible objects. In the mind, then, “not only is the much heralded
gold mountain made of gold, but the round square is as surely round as it is square.” Meinong
argues that it is not the case that the round square has no being but, rather, that it subsists as a
nonbeing (Nichtsein). See Alexius Meinong, “Theory of Objects,” in Realism and the Background of
Phenomenology, ed. R. M. Chisholm (New York: Free Press, 1960), 76–117.
8. See Alexius Meinong, Über Annahmen, 1902.
9. The contributions both in defense and opposition to market socialism have become
known as the socialist calculation debate and they can be summarized as follows. The first
contribution was made by Ludwig von Mises in 1922. See especially “The Artificial Market as the
Solution of the Problem of Economic Calculation,” in Socialism (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics,
1981). In that work, Mises denies the possibility of economic calculation and rational resource
allocation in market socialism. He argues that economic calculation can take place only by means
of money prices established in a market for producer goods resting on private ownership of the
means of production. By definition, Mises insists that markets cannot exist in socialism. Hence,
market socialism can never achieve an efficient allocation of resources. The defense of market
socialism was presented by Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, “On the Economic Theory of
Socialism,” Review of Economic Studies 4, no. 1 (October 1936): 60–66. This paper presents a
model of market socialism in which prices are fixed by the central planning board on a trial and
error basis that attempts to anticipate the supply and demand of households and socialist firms.
With the advent of computers thirty years later, Oskar Lange published “The Computer and the
Market,” in Socialism, Capitalism, and Economic Growth, ed. C. H. Feinstein (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1967), 158–61. Lange argues that centralized calculation involving
mathematical programming with computers is both feasible and necessary for the type of central
planning that he calls market-oriented. Another well-known defense of market socialism was
advanced by H. D. Dickinson in Economics of Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939).
Dickinson proposes the same solution as Lange and Taylor: a system of price fixing by a central
authority, where the state of the market of a particular commodity, that is, the relation of
demand to supply, merely serves as an indicator to either raise or lower the prescribed price.
Friedrich von Hayek contributes a lengthy and thorough reply to market socialism defenders in
“Socialist Calculation Debate I: The Nature and History of the Problem,” “Socialist Calculation
Debate II: The State of the Debate (1935),” and “Socialist Calculation Debate III: The Competi-
tive ‘Solution’,” in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1948), 119–208. Hayek observes: “The difference between such a system of regimented prices
and a system of prices determined by the market seems to be about the same as that between an
attacking army in which every unit and every man could move only by special command and by
the exact distance ordered by headquarters, and an army in which every unit and every man can
take advantage of every opportunity offered to them.”  History has confirmed the warnings of
Mises and Hayek.
10. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, trans. James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz (New York:
New York University Press, 1976), 94–106.
11. Ibid., 115–16. This exposition advanced in 1871 is the first complete formulation of the
theory of subjective economic value, which remains as the received theory of value in contem-
porary economics.
12. According to Ludwig von Mises, “The transformation of thought which the classical
economists had initiated was brought to its consummation only by modern subjectivist economics,
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Human Nature and the Discipline of Economics: Personalist Anthropology and Economic Methodology
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001).
29. The distinction between first-order goods and higher-order goods was Carl Menger’s contri-
bution at the turn of the nineteenth century. He is the founder of the Austrian school of economics,
but this and many other of his contributions went beyond the boundaries of the Austrian School
and into the present mainstream of economic thought. See Menger’s Principles of Economics.
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